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Food Safety and Chinese Geographical Indications 
 
Introduction 
Alongside tremendous economic growth, China has experienced numerous food 
scandals. In 2008, 53,000 children were made ill by milk powder contaminated with 
the industrial chemical melamine. Doubts as to whether food safety is firmly within 
government control have been reinforced by several other incidents, such as when 
Shanghai's food safety authority found evidence that a suspicious level of an antiviral 
drug was present in Yum Brands Inc’s Kentucky Fried Chicken in December, 2012. 
Amongst Chinese consumers, there is a growing tendency to search for their food 
more carefully, with special attention paid to safety (IBM, 2008). In fact, based on an 
investigation with more than 1000 Chinese respondents, Ouyang (2011) even declares 
that 94.5% of consumers have questioned the safety level of Chinese food products. 
Certified food products, such as organic products and those that are registered under 
‘Geographical Indication’ (GI) systems, are thus becoming the subject of increased 
interest from the point of view of safety. 
 
It would be reasonable for consumers to believe that GIs not only present “localised 
quality” to the market but also offer a “double guarantee” on food safety, given that 
the qualification process, in theory, follows a defined code of practice that at least 
meets national minimum safety standards (Henchion and McIntyre, 2000; Parrott et 
al., 2002). Yet, there have been reports of a number of Chinese GI food products with 
‘unacceptable’ safety levels, such as Jinhua ham poisoned by pesticides, illegal food 
additives used in the production of Longkou cellophane noodles and Baiyangdian 
duck eggs that contained a poisonous red dye. Frequent instances highlighting food 
safety concerns demonstrate that the Chinese GI system is not working as had been 
expected and it is this apparent deficiency that serves as the focal point for this paper.  
 
Food crises and the GI context 
It is government’s responsibility to define the legally acceptable composition of food 
products in order to protect the public from unsafe foodstuffs (Barling, 2004). 
Governments generally issue measurable safety standards and develop control and 
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monitoring systems in response to ‘both real and perceived food safety problems’ 
(Henson and Caswell, 1999 p.589). Products falling below minimum safety standards 
would be removed from the market. 
 
For several decades, foods produced in accordance with these objective and 
measurable technical parameters have met with broad social support. Consumers have 
come to rely on ‘uniform standards’ to judge the safety level of food products 
(Goodman and Watts, 1997; Renting et al., 2003). For almost three decades, however, 
food crises such as BSE, chemical contamination and concern over genetically 
modified foods, have heightened concerns in conjunction with anxieties related to the 
mass standardised food industry. The succession of safety problems has altered some 
consumers’ opinions and challenged their confidence in the ‘uniform standards’ 
approach (Goodman, 1999). As Beck (2001, p.273) stated, ‘many things that were 
once considered universally certain and safe and vouched for by every conceivable 
authority [e.g. beef] turn … out to be deadly’. Many consumers no longer tend to 
unconditionally believe or trust standardised food products (Shine et al., 1997; 
Benbrook et al., 2008).  
 
In this situation, many consumers want more information about their food to make the 
right decision and to protect themselves (Hunt and Frewer, 2001). In developed 
countries, and stimulated by consumers’ demands and citizen engagement with food 
issues, many small-scale farmers ‘increasingly squeezed by industrialisation’ (Fine, 
1994 p.524; Van Der Ploeg et al., 2000) have turned to ‘alternative’ agrifood 
networks (AAFNs). Configured differently, for example, in the form of short food 
supply chains, farmers’ markets, organic farming practices, and place-based 
production, AAFNs ‘attempt to create ‘closer’ relationships between producers and 
consumers’ (Kneafsey et al., 2008 p.37) and hence decrease the perceived ‘risk’ of 
consumers (Murdoch et al., 2000; Goodman, 2003; Winter, 2003).  
 
Through indicating food products’ special geographic origins, GIs can be understood 
as a specific branch of AAFNs as many consumers believe that locally recognisable 
food products, being more traceable and produced according to defined codes of 
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practice, are of higher quality than standard products and by implication, offer a 
reliable guarantee of safety (Kuznesof et al., 1997; Parrott et al., 2002; Mansfield, 
2003; Kneafsey et al., 2008). Examples of GI systems include the French appellation 
d'origin scheme and the European ‘PDO’ and ‘PGI’ systems. Within GI systems, 
producers are required to co-operate together to apply for GIs from the government 
based on preset GI qualification schemes. Anybody located in the specific area and 
making products conforming to the requirements of the qualification process, has the 
right to use GIs on their products after application. In the GI system, it is in theory 
always up to the government department and/or an independent third party to inspect 
production processes, guarantee the conformity of actors to official norms, and protect 
the GI against fraud (O’Reilly and Hains, 2004; Hayes et al., 2004, 2005). Therefore, 
the safety level of food products with GIs is often deemed higher than other similar 
products because the qualification and inspection processes follow certain food safety 
criteria presented by producers in the application process. In China during the last 
decade, however, many sub-standard unsafe GI food products have been reported in 
the food market. In order to uncover the reason for this situation, the need to evaluate 
the ability of the Chinese GI system to secure ‘pre-set’ food safety levels is becoming 
very urgent. 
 
Chinese GI schemes 
The first time geographical origins attracted Chinese attention was in the 1980s when 
China became one of the signatories to the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property 1883, in 1985. Three parallel legislative frameworks, established 
by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s 
Republic of China (AQSIQ), and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic 
of China (MoA), exist to regulate the Chinese GI system [1]. 
 
Based on the Trademark law, in 2003, the SAIC issued a regulation entitled ‘Measures 
for the Registration and Administration of Collective Marks and Qualification Marks’ 
to provide some specific rules and explanations in the management of GIs. According 
to the regulation, any party applying for the registration of a GI as a collective mark 
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or a qualification mark must present information regarding ‘the special quality, 
reputation or other characteristics of the commodity branded with the geographical 
indication; the relation between the natural and cultural factors of the region 
by the geographical indication and the special quality, reputation or other 
characteristics of the commodity; and the scope of the region indicated by the 
geographical indication’. Articles 17 and 18 note that ‘the collective members of the 
registrant of a collective trademark may use the collective trademark upon carrying 
the procedures stipulated in the rules for administration of the use of the collective 
trademark; Collective trademarks may not be used by non-collective members’ and 
‘[P]arties that meet the requirements specified in the rules for administration of the 
of a qualification trademark may use such trademarks upon carrying out the 
procedures specified in the rules for administration of the use of the qualification 
trademark, and the registrant may not refuse to carry out the procedures’ (State 
Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C., 2003). 
 
Beside the SAIC, the AQSIQ also confirmed its authority to regulate the GI system 
based on the ‘Provisions on Protection of GI Products’. According to Article 10, to 
register a GI the applicant should submit the following documents: ‘local 
government’s proposal for the defined limits of the place of origin of the product of a 
geographical indication; local government’s document establishing the application 
organisation or designating an association or enterprise as an applicant; 
documentary material proving the product of geographical indication’. In order to use 
the GI, the manufacturer located in the territory has to file an application to the local 
AQSIQ and submit the following documents: ‘an application for use of the exclusive 
indication of the products of geographical indication; a certificate issued by the 
competent authorities of the local government proving that the products concerned 
originate from the particular area; and an inspection report issued by the relevant 
product quality inspection department’ (Article 20). As a supervisory department, the 
AQSIQ still has the right to monitor and supervise production processes of GI 
products, even after registration (General Administration for Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine of the P.R.C., 2005). 
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The third GI framework was established by the MoA with its ‘Measures for the 
Administration of Geographical Indications of Agricultural Products’. According to 
Article 9, the documents that must be offered to apply for a GI are, ‘a registration 
application form; a certificate on the qualification of the applicant; a description on 
the typical characteristics of the product and a corresponding product quality 
appraisal report; the environmental conditions of the producing area of the product, 
the technical norms for production and the technical norms for product quality safety; 
a document determining the territorial scope, and a distribution map of its producing 
area; a straight sample or a sample picture of the product; and other necessary 
descriptive or evidentiary material’. In the registered territorial scope, an entity or 
individual may apply to the certificate holder to use the registered GI after supplying 
the following documents: ‘the agricultural product produced or traded by it/him 
originates from the territorial scope indicated in the registration certificate; it/he has 
obtained the corresponding qualification for producing or trading the agricultural 
product concerned; it/he is capable of conducting producing and trading activities in 
strict accordance with the prescribed quality and technical norms; and it/he has the 
capacity for the market development and operation of the agricultural product 
concerned’ (Article 15). Based on the ‘Measures’, the relevant administrative 
department of agriculture at or above the county level holds the right to supervise and 
examine the usage of GIs on a regular basis (The Center for Agri-food Quality & 
Safety, the Ministry of Agriculture of the P.R.C., 2008). 
 
Theoretically, GI food products should be ‘safe’ to eat as the proposed specific GI 
standards can be secured through qualification and inspection processes. But, the 
safety aspect is only mentioned in the MoA framework with no ‘higher safety level’ 
requirements. In other words, special safety standards are not a necessary condition to 
apply for GIs and ‘pre-set’ GI safety standards can be the same as government 
compulsory safety standards. The effectiveness of the Chinese GI system in offering 
extra security on food safety thus remains uncertain. 
 
The Chinese food safety regulatory system  
Within the Chinese GI system, the SAIC, the AQSIQ and the MoA are given the 
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inspection authority to ensure the safety level of GI food products. However, in the 
face of numerous Chinese food crises, not only these three government departments 
but also the prevailing Chinese food safety regulatory system has been criticised by 
many researchers (e.g. Tam and Yang 2005; Roth et al., 2008) for a number of 
reasons.  
 
Firstly, the Chinese food safety regulatory system is relatively complicated. Four 
ministries and agencies, namely the SAIC, the AQSIQ, the MoA, and the National 
Health and Family Planning Commission of the P.R.C. are empowered to ensure food 
safety according to different laws, such as the Product Quality Law of the P.R.C., the 
Food Safety Law of the P.R.C., and the Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law of 
the P.R.C. The fragmentation of responsibility and regulatory authority for food safety 
among those government ministries and agencies has a negative impact upon the 
effectiveness and efficiency of food safety control (Figure 1), because ‘[I]n certain 
aspects, there may be excessive enforcement; in others, shirking of responsibility may 
be the outcome’ (Tam and Yang, 2005 p.14). The opportunity to provide unsafe food 
products thus emerged (State Intellectual Property Office of the P.R.C., 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1: The responsibilities of the four departments involved in control of food safety in China 
 
Secondly, building an effective food safety control system to govern production and 
marketing activities is still work in progress in China. Marketing research has noted 
that many of the food problems can be traced back to farms where safety is almost 
uncontrollable. Williams (2005) and Roberts and Engardio (2006) commented that 
obtaining a high profit is difficult in the contemporary competitive Chinese food 
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market because most traders go to the cheapest supplier. Consequently, food 
producers prefer to rely heavily on the use of chemical inputs to increase production 
and to deal with pests. The problem is, with low education levels in the use of 
chemicals, many farmers believe that the more chemicals they use, the better their 
products (see also Brogaard and Zhao, 2002). Over or inappropriate usage may thus 
occur, such as farmers failing to wait for the prescribed number of days between the 
last application of a pesticide and the harvest resulting in excessive residues in the 
harvested product (World Bank, 2006; Calvin et al., 2006). Rural China is filled with 
millions of small-scale farms occupying less than 0.80 ha [2] of land (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 2012), and how to secure the safety level of food products 
through a relatively small number of government inspectors remains a problem. 
Meanwhile, millions of small-scale food traders who dominate most of the food trade 
in the Chinese market handle small volumes of products and operate on a cash basis 
with no or little documentation [3] (Calvin et al., 2006; Roth et al., 2008). It is almost 
impossible for government officers to trace and recall unsafe food products from the 
market. With no inspection but motivated by profit maximisation, producing and 
trading unsafe food products seems an unavoidable consequence in today’s Chinese 
food market. As Roberts and Engardio (2006) argue, the pursuit of profit is not a 
problem by itself but problems arise when that pursuit takes a short-term orientation 
and is not kept in check by market or regulatory forces.  
 
Thirdly, in order to increase government tax income and employment opportunities, 
local governments may protect counterfeiting businesses by laxly enforcing 
regulations over food safety. As Luo Yunbo, Dean of the Food and Nutrition College 
of China Agricultural University asserts, ‘if local governments close all the companies 
that violate food regulations, a lot of workers will lose their jobs’ (Engardio et al., 
2007 p.42). Indeed, there are cases where some food producers are able to obtain legal 
licenses in spite of poor production conditions. Guanshengyuan, a famous food 
company in China, was reported making moon-cakes using expired materials in 2001, 
and Jijihong, a big franchised catering company, was discovered using unsafe 
additives in food processing in 2010.  
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The combination of a fragmented regulatory system, an ineffective monitoring system, 
and a thriving counterfeiting business present a challenge to the government to secure 
food safety in China. According to the results of an investigation run by the 
Greenpeace Organisation to check vegetable pesticide residue level, the 
non-compliance rates with governmental standards in 2014 were 34% in Guangzhou 
markets and 40% in Beijing markets (Greenpeace Organisation, 2015). Because it 
appears difficult to ensure food safety through the prevailing food safety regulatory 
system (see also Bristow, 2007), the ability of the SAIC, the AQSIQ and the MoA to 
inspect the safety level of GI food products can be questioned. 
 
Research methodology 
To assess the effectiveness of Chinese GI schemes in offering extra guarantees on 
food safety through qualification and inspection programmes, network concepts were 
applied to three exploratory GI case studies. Network concepts focus on ‘how 
different kinds of nodes (people, firms, states, places and organisations) are connected 
to one another in complex and multi-stranded ways’ (Hughes, 2000 P.178) and have 
been adopted in various forms by many agrifood scholars (e.g. Hughes, 2000; Ilbery 
and Maye, 2005; Tregear et al., 2007). GI schemes were thus conceptualized as 
networks of different actors who are connected through both ‘vertical commodity 
exchange relationships’ and ‘the multi-directional flows of information and materials 
that variously support these exchange relationships’ (Hughes, 2000 p.178) to generate 
agrifood products within certain safety criteria. Using this approach, an investigation 
of selected GI networks was carried out to examine ‘how relations amongst people 
and things might be imagined, assembled and translated to effect co-ordination at a 
distance’ (Larner and Le Heron, 2002 p.417).  
 
Up until the end of 2010, 1,949 GI products were registered with the three Chinese GI 
frameworks of which 94.9% are food products (Beijing Zhongjunshiji GIs 
Researching Team, 2011). As the number of GIs is too large to undertake an 
exhaustive investigation, preliminary research was first conducted to choose suitable 
samples. Based in Jiangxi Province where the main researcher lives [4], four 
agricultural researchers at Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics and Jiangxi 
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Agricultural University along with twelve GI food consumers formed focus groups 
where several important sampling criteria were identified, including ‘valuable’ (with 
high value of output), ‘accessible’ (many potential interviewees), ‘typical’ 
(small-scale farms) and ‘variable quality reputation’. Through a pre-test survey with 
twelve supermarket consumers, three GI food products
5
, namely Gannan navel orange, 
Nanfeng mandarin, and Wuyuan green tea, were finally chosen to undertake the 
research [6].  
 
Taking into account culturally acceptable modes of engaging with participants in 
China, the use of ‘gatekeepers’ to gain access to relevant data and networks was 
regarded as a necessary first step in this investigation. Therefore, at least three 
government officers within each GI network were recommended by four scholars at 
the two aforementioned Universities in Jiangxi province. Then, these government 
officers were contacted by telephone and asked if they would like to participate in this 
research and whether they were able to contact further potential interviewees who are 
personally involved with food safety issues within the network, such as technicians, 
farmers and middlemen. After obtaining positive answers, the investigation was 
conducted. Finally, government officers, drafters of GI standards, managers of GI 
holders, farmers, processors, intermediaries, and managers of the contract farming 
system totaling 43 individuals were interviewed [7] with around 14-15 interviewees in 
each case study. They each were asked to answer questions following an interview 
guide that was designed in advance and related to the effectiveness of the regulatory 
programmes, production behaviour, GI standards and GI label issuing procedures. In 
practice, respondents were also encouraged to engage in a more open and interactive 
discussion under the guarantee of anonymity. 
 
Data analysis 
All primary and secondary data collected was processed in three phases, namely 
transcription, classification, and connection. From the data analysis, a number of 
important themes emerged. 
 
The impact of GI issuing procedures upon safety based on GI standards  
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In China, the GI system requires that products have to meet ‘pre-set’ standards before 
being sold under the GI. GI food products are thus supposed to offer an extra 
guarantee of safety. However, the case studies indicate that the safety level of Chinese 
GI products may be little different to non-GI products due to ‘low’ or ‘basic’ GI 
standards and inappropriate GI issuing procedures.  
 
Chinese farmers were discouraged from co-operation until 2006 when the ‘Law of the 
P.R.C. on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives’ was approved. Due to a lack of 
accumulated knowledge, effective independent farmers’ co-operatives were rare in the 
study region, and ‘pre-set’ GI standards were thus proposed by the local government. 
For instance, ‘The National Standard: Product of geographical indication — Gannan 
navel orange’ (GB/T 20355-2006)’ was written by the Jiangxi Association of 
Standardisation [8], the Ganzhou Fruit Industry Bureau, and the Ganzhou Bureau of 
Quality and Technical Supervision. ‘The National Standard: Product of geographic 
indication — Nanfeng mandarin’ (GB/T 19051-2008), was written by the Jiangxi 
Provincial Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, the Fuzhou City Bureau of 
Quality and Technical Supervision, and the Nanfeng county Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision. Whilst there is no national standard for Wuyuan green tea, the 
GI standard drafter interviewed also pointed out that ‘pre-set’ GI standards presented 
to the AQSIQ, the SAIC and the MoA in the GI application processes were made by 
government technical officers under local government requirements.  
 
To meet its aim of increasing local incomes, understandably, the local government 
prefers to issue ‘low’ or ‘basic’ rather than ‘strict’ GI standards to ensure all products 
produced in the protection area can be retailed under the GI. Therefore, issuing safety 
standards for the three GI products that are identical to the compulsory national 
standards has become an unavoidable result for the Gannan area, Nanfeng county and 
Wuyuan county governments. For instance, according to the national standard of 
Gannan navel orange, the safety level of Gannan navel oranges should meet the 
requirement of NY5014 (Products of No-social Effects of Pollution — Hesperidium 
Fruits) which is the compulsory national standard. Also, based on the national 
standard of Nanfeng mandarins, the safety level of Nanfeng mandarins should meet 
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the requirement of both NY 5014 and GB/T 12947 (National standard of Fresh Citrus). 
The safety standards contained in GB/T 12947 are also compulsory national standards 
for fresh citrus. 
 
In practice, even such ‘basic’ standards are compromised due to an inappropriate 
quality checking stage and thus the perceived extra safety guarantee is not entirely 
met under the GI issuing procedure. Within the Gannan navel orange case, applicants 
who want to apply for a GI on their products need only to complete the application 
form and hand it into the local Fruit Industry Bureau. On obtaining the permit of the 
city government, the applicants can use GI labels for one year after a certain payment 
has been made. A physical quality checking stage is not involved at all. In the 
Nanfeng mandarin case, farmers can get GI labels for free [9] without application or 
quality checking stages, and trading companies/intermediaries are simply required to 
hand the application form into the local government office and pay for GI labels but 
again without proceeding through a quality checking processes. Even though the GI 
issuing procedure in the Wuyuan green tea case is slightly different from the other two 
cases given that there is a checking stage, the procedure is still questionable as the 
sample itself is offered by the applicants themselves rather than being selected 
independently using scientific sampling methods. 
 
The effectiveness of government inspection programmes on ensuring safety levels 
Within Chinese GI schemes, GI food products are produced in protected areas and 
their safety level can be secured not only by GI issuing procedures but also by 
government regulatory authorities through inspection programmes based on GI 
standards. However, the Chinese weakness emerges when the government not only 
proposes and executes but also inspects GI standards within the economic policy 
context. Each of the three case studies revealed that safety standards are not 
well-known or embedded within the production processes of the respective GI 
networks.  
 
This situation may have been caused by several reasons. Firstly, the overlapping 
regulatory authorities between different government departments has reduced the 
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impact of standards. For example, in the Gannan navel orange case, Government 
Officer A believed that it was the responsibility of the local SAIC to regulate the 
pesticide market to ensure the safety level of Gannan navel oranges in the market. But, 
Government Officer B indicated that, it is the responsibility of the agricultural 
department to control farming inputs, such as pesticides and fertilisers. The direct 
result of overlapping regulatory responsibilities was demonstrated by comments such 
as, ‘I know some sorts of forbidden pesticides cannot be used, but some farmers still 
can and prefer to buy and use them because of the low cost’ (Government Officer C).  
 
Unclear responsibilities also slow the response of the government to some accidents. 
For instance, dyed Gannan navel oranges [10] have been found several times on the 
market over the last decade and the safety level of Gannan navel oranges was thus 
questioned by consumers. But, several tonnes of dyed Gannan navel oranges were still 
reported by journalists even in the winter of 2014. Government Officer A complained 
that,  
 
‘It is the (Ganzhou Fruit Industry) Bureau’s duty to catch the dealers who dyed and 
sold these navel oranges. However, … as the Bureau has no authority in law to 
sentence and make any punishment, I do not know which department, the SAIC or the 
AQSIQ, would help the Bureau to manage this situation’ 
 
Secondly, for some reasons, government officers infrequently regulate production 
activities or check the safety level of GI products at farm level. As Government 
Technician B in the Nanfeng mandarin case explained,  
 
‘[N]ot many officers work for my department, it is impossible to regulate production 
activities and check the quality regularly’ 
 
For government officers, there is even a perceived trade-off between strict inspection 
programmes and farmers’ incomes because ‘strict inspection programmes may 
increase inputs and thus decrease producers’ incomes and the local government’s (tax) 
income’ (Government Officer A in the Nanfeng mandarin case). Reducing the 
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frequency of market inspection programmes and believing safety inspection is not a 
regular ‘priority task for the county’s government’ (Government Officer B in the 
Gannan navel orange case) are becoming commonplace in the three sample cases. 
 
Thirdly, the limited acknowledgement by government technicians of the safety aspect 
weakens government enforcement. For example, Technician B, who is also a 
government officer, in the Gannan navel orange case pointed out, ‘… the high level of 
pesticide remaining does not matter. Most of the time, farmers or middlemen only 
need to sell their navel oranges later, because pesticides remaining on the peel would 
decrease as time passes by’. However, this point is debatable. According to Kang et al. 
(2002), the chemical materials can be absorbed by the oranges through the root from 
the soil rather than simply remaining on the peel. Also, within the Wuyuan green tea 
case, Government officer C indicated ‘…it is important to wash the tea by hot water 
before drinking as the dust can be washed and germs can be killed”. In these 
examples, it seems that the attitude of the technicians towards safety aspects has 
become an obstacle to enhancing government enforcement.  
 
The safety forming processes in practice 
This given the prevailing context of inappropriate GI issuing processes, overlapping 
regulatory authorities, infrequent safety inspection programmes and the unconcerned 
attitudes of some government technicians towards the safety aspect, producers 
recognise that ‘[N]owadays, nobody takes care of the quality (including the safety 
aspect) and checks it’ (Farmer C in the Wuyuan green tea case). Therefore, very few 
individual producers pay specific attention to the undetectable safety aspects of their 
products, an attitude strengthened by the fact that final consumers themselves have a 
very limited ability to evaluate the food product safety (e.g. dust in the tea, the level 
of chemical residues)  
 
As Middleman C from the Gannan navel orange case explained, ‘…it is difficult for 
the individual consumer to judge the safety level… Even though products should be 
produced according to government safety standards, the safety issue in the retail 
market is not important at all … I do not purchase navel oranges based on the safety 
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standards’. All ‘useless’ costs are thus cut. For example, within the Wuyuan green tea 
case, individual farmers process most of their fresh tea leaves and shoots in small 
processing factories which charge a hiring fee through offering processing equipment. 
Even though the hygiene conditions in these small-scale processing factories are 
questionable (such as limited processing space which means that some farmers dry 
their tea products on the road in the sunshine), farmers still prefer to use them due to 
cost considerations. Farmer B specified,  
 
‘… due to the cost, it is impossible for me to purchase a processing machine 
individually. … the price of refined tea products is always less than 100 RMB per KG. 
But, processing 1 KG refined green tea needs at least 4-5 hours by hand. The 
personal input is even higher than the price middlemen paid. … (therefore, without 
any concern about the hygiene conditions) I use processing equipment in small 
processing factories by paying a hiring fee’  
  
According to interviewees, only those farmers who are contracted farmers, i.e. those 
who deliver all their produce to large middlemen/processors at a certain future price 
but represent only a small proportion of total products produced, are able to satisfy the 
safety conditions but mainly because of the ability of the large-scale buyers to check 
safety.  
 
Accordingly, contracted Farmer C explained that although he knows the usage of 
pesticides can increase the output, he only spreads pesticides once or twice a year 
according to the suggestion of the contracted processor’s technicians. But ironically, 
in order to allow their products to be defined as ‘good quality’ in the market and avoid 
market risks, the products sold by contracted middlemen/processors to the market are 
always under private trademarks rather than GIs for the simple reason that currently 
the quality level (including the safety aspects) of GI food products remains difficult to 
ensure. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has highlighted increasing consumers’ concerns about food safety in China 
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over the past decade. This situation presents a challenge and yet an opportunity for the 
Chinese government to improve food safety levels. Currently, growing attention is 
being placed upon an evolving GI system. As qualified labels, GIs have potential to 
offer an extra opportunity to secure the safety level of food products. However, with 
three parallel legislative GI frameworks and an ineffective prevailing food safety 
regulatory system, the ability of the Chinese GI system to deliver a special guarantee 
on food safety is still questionable. Therefore, given that little research has been 
undertaken, this investigation has conducted an initial exploration to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Chinese GI schemes in securing food safety. 
 
The research findings from this paper demonstrate that the Chinese GI system as 
applied to three case study products is not able to offer an extra guarantee on food 
safety. It appears that the Chinese authorities are missing an opportunity to improve 
food safety via the GI system due to the focus on raising farmers’ income rather than 
reducing safety concerns. This situation not only inhibits consumers’ agency within 
the network but also highlights the inappropriate structure of Chinese GI schemes as 
no independent standard auditor and inspector exists beside the government.  
 
Theoretically, the safety level of GI food products should be more secure because of 
appropriate GI issuing procedures and specific government inspection programmes 
based on strict GI standards. However, in contrast to many European cases, within 
which GI systems appeared in tandem with consumers’ safety concerns relating to 
falling confidence in industrial conventional ‘uniform standards’ (Ilbery and Kneafsey, 
2000; Winter, 2003), both the industrial agrifood system and the GI system developed 
simultaneously in the 1990s in China. In other words, Chinese GI networks developed 
not in response to consumers’ changing attitudes to industrial food products but as an 
expression of the government’s aim to increase farmers’ incomes. Therefore, based on 
the European experience that co-operative behaviour can enhance food safety levels 
(Callon et al., 2002; Gade, 2004; O’Reilly and Haines, 2004), the government needs 
to be aware of the danger of bureaucracy and future research is urgently required to 
not only explore methods to encourage producers to attend GI management 
programmes, to generate appropriate GI standards, to be actively involved in GI 
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issuing processes, and thus to provide ‘safe’ GI products, but also enhance consumers’ 
ability to identify some of the safety risks in the GI products. Meanwhile, the 
investigation shows that the large processors may play an important role in ensuring 
food safety within Chinese GI networks. As effective cooperation between farmers 
and large processors may be a potential solution to secure food safety within Chinese 
GI networks, specific attention to the design of co-operative mechanisms and models 
for expansion is required. In addition, with weak government enforcement, there is 
also an increasing need to build an effective food safety regulatory system to ensure 
food safety and protect consumers’ rights in the Chinese food sector. Intertwined in 
this debate is a wider research concern about the Chinese government’s regulatory 
system and how an effective food safety control system to govern production and 
marketing activities can be developed to work in tandem with a given political 
environment. Finally, a limitation of this study was the use of three samples from 
similar product categories. Further work could include a comparison with different GI 
products (such as chicken, fish, and wine) to examine potential differences between 
GI networks.  
 
Notes 
 
1 In China, the National People’s Congress ranks the highest in the administrative system pyramid and the State Council is the 
chief administrative authority. These three ministries and agencies lie directly under the State Council. This structure is replicated at 
the provincial and county levels. 
2 (Total sown area + Tea plantation area + Orchards area)/(population in rural areas/average family household size) (National 
Bureau of Statistic of China, 2012) 
3 Traditional food supply system dominates the food sector in China rather than the industrial food system 
4 Stake (2005) indicates whatever cases are chosen should offer the opportunity to maximize what can be learned. Considering the 
social relationships of the researchers, the time span for undertaking the research and the distribution of GI numbers in China, 
Jiangxi Province where the main researcher lives was chosen to do the research
 
(67 GI products are produced in Jiangxi Province 
which is a little bit higher than the average number of 64 per province/autonomous regions/municipality and 34% higher than the 
median number of 50 per province/autonomous regions/municipality in China) 
5 More data focusing on food quality based on these three cases can be found on Zhao et al. (2014)  
6 Due to different regulation system between national and international markets and limited export amount of three products (only 
around 2.29% production of Gannan navel oranges and 7.45% output of Nanfeng mandarins were exported to international markets 
in 2009, and 12% of the annual output value of Wuyuan green tea was contributed by international markets in 2010), three case 
studies only focus on national market. 
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7 Individual consumers were not investigated as actors in this research. Instead, middlemen were interviewed as agencies of 
consumers because they know consumers/market requirements very well. 
8 A technical association formed by technological experts and administrated and funded by the government 
9 The government officers send GI labels to different villages and farmers can use as many as they like 
10 Using staining materials to make navel oranges look better
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